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ARTICLES
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS
RATIONALES FOR MAKING SHAREHOLDERS




Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and
directors of both public and closely held firms owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders and to shareholders alone. Directors and officers are le-
gally required to manage a corporation for the exclusive benefit of its
shareholders, and protection for other sorts of claimants exists only
to the extent provided by contract. This legal norm, however, has
been subjected to considerable stress as a result of recent legislative
action in a majority of states that authorizes (or, in the case of one
state, requires)! directors to take into account the interests of other
"constituencies" such as employees, suppliers, customers, and the lo-
cal community in making business decisions.2
This Article examines the three primary criticisms that have
been levelled at the nonshareholder constituency statutes. The first
criticism is that these statutes are unwise because they conflict with
the underlying premise of corporate law that fiduciary duties should
flow only to a firm's residual claimants. This argument is based on
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., Harvard University,
1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1982. Professor Macey serves as Reporter to the ABA's Committee
on Corporate Laws. The views expressed in this paper are Professor Macey's alone, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Committee on Corporate Laws or the American Bar Associa-
tion Section on Business Law.
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e) (1991).
2. For a list of these statutes, see Symposium appendix, infra p. 279. The American Bar
Association Committee on Corporate Laws decided not to include such a provision in the Re-
vised Model Business Corporation Act. ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituen-
cies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2253 (1990).
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the idea that residual claimants have the greatest incentive to maxi-
mize corporate value and therefore place the highest value on the le-
gal protection afforded by fiduciary duties. The conclusion that only
residual claimants deserve the benefit of fiduciary duties does not
logically follow from the premise that they are the group that places
the highest value on the legal protection afforded by fiduciary duties.
Specifically, this Article will show that, over a wide range of corpo-
rate decisions made by officers and directors, gap-filling responsibili-
ties analogous to those provided by the fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders are needed to protect nonshareholder constituencies
such as workers, customers and suppliers.
Although the status of shareholders as residual claimants does
not provide support for making them the exclusive beneficiary of
managers' fiduciary obligations, nonetheless, for other reasons, fiduci-
ary duties should flow to residual claimants, and to residual claim-
ants alone. For one thing, the very nature of other claimants' inter-
ests makes it easier for them to protect against post-contractual
opportunism by the firm. In addition, nonshareholder constituencies
already enjoy the protection provided by judicial gap-filling and do
not need the additional gap-filling protections afforded by fiduciary
duties.
The second criticism levelled at nonshareholder constituency
statutes is that they require corporate agents to serve so many mas-
ters - employees, communities, bondholders, customers, suppliers -
that the costs of dual fiduciary duties in terms of confusion and mis-
understanding by courts and litigants vastly outweigh any potential
benefits that the statutes might provide. But this argument ignores
the fact that corporations long have been able to issue multiple clas-
ses of shares with different economic and voting rights, with manage-
ment owing fiduciary duties to each of these classes. Thus, it simply
cannot be said that corporate law is incapable of reconciling the fidu-
ciary claims of a variety of competing interests. The argument also
ignores the effects of the business judgment rule. Because most man-
agers' actions are effectively protected against judicial scrutiny any-
way, as a practical matter, the rights being taken away from share-
holders by nonshareholder constituency statutes do not provide much
in the way of concrete benefits for shareholders in the first place.
Thus, the real problem with nonshareholder constituency stat-
utes is not that they take away something of value from the only
group that has any incentive to maximize the value of the firm, be-
cause other constituencies such as fixed claimants or workers often
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have the greatest stake in the decisions being made. Similarly, non-
shareholder constituency statutes cannot be condemned on the
grounds that they upset a system of legal rules that present a preex-
isting set of clearly defined behavioral guidelines for officers and di-
rectors. No such set of guidelines exists.
It is the third criticism levelled at these statutes that presents
the most compelling argument against them. This problem is that
nonshareholder constituency statutes fail to recognize that fiduciary
duties are owed to residual claimants and residual claimants alone
because this is the group that faces the most severe set of contracting
problems with respect to defining the nature and extent of the obli-
gations owed to them by officers and directors.
Other constituencies besides shareholders face contracting
problems, to be sure, but these problems can be solved at far less cost
than those confronting shareholders. Thus, fiduciary duties should
properly be seen as a method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts.
And shareholders place a far greater value on the protection provided
by this gap-filling than do the nonshareholder constituencies of a
corporation.
This observation, of course, raises a follow-up question: If gap-
filling is a useful device from the shareholders' perspective, why not
from the perspective of nonshareholder constituencies as well? Here I
argue that under modern principles of contract law, courts do fill in
gaps for these other constituencies; but they do so against the back-
ground of the preexisting contracts that these groups have with the
firm. Thus, gap-filling for employees or bondholders is done in the
context of interpreting the employment contracts, collective bargain-
ing agreements, bond indentures, and covenants that these other
groups have with the corporation.
The obvious exception to this general rule arises with regard to
the local communities in which large corporations operate. Unlike
other constituencies, the local community has no preexisting agree-
ment with the firm, leaving no gap for a court to fill. But the local
community is, or should be, well represented in the political process.
Any grievance felt by the community should be taken up with local
political officials.
Finally, this paper considers - and rejects - the familiar (dare
I say tiresome) argument that nonshareholder constituency statutes
are worthwhile because they prevent inefficient wealth transfers from
other constituencies, particularly bondholders and employees, to
shareholders. The question is not whether such wealth transfers are
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theoretically possible - clearly they are. Rather, the salient issues
are: (1) whether the dangers associated with such wealth transfers
can be avoided by contractually negotiated covenants between the
fixed claimants and the firm; and (2) whether attempting to mitigate
this wealth transfer problem through the promulgation of non-
shareholder constituency statutes poses social costs that are greater
than the social benefits. Here I argue that the problem of wealth
transfers from fixed claimants such as bondholders and employees to
shareholders can be dealt with by contract and that the costs to soci-
ety of attempting to mitigate this wealth transfer problem through
the promulgation of nonshareholder constituency statutes will be
greater than any benefits that such statutes might provide. Indeed, it
seems patently clear that the true purpose of these statutes is to ben-
efit a single nonshareholder constituency, namely the top managers
of publicly held corporation who want still another weapon in their
arsenal of antitakeover protective devices. Like many other legisla-
tive initiatives, nonshareholder constituency statutes do not benefit
the interests or groups that they ostensibly are intended to benefit.
II. THE THREE CRITICISMS OF NONSHAREHOLDER
CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
A. The Residual Claimant Argument
The most well-known argument supporting the proposition that
fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders is derived
from the insight of modern financial theory that shareholders retain
the ultimate authority to control the corporation because they have
the greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decisionmaking.3 The
idea here is that, despite the fact that corporations are merely com-
plex webs of contractual relations - and despite the fact that share-
holders do not "own" the modern, publicly held firm in any meaning-
ful sense - the ultimate right to guide the firm (or, more precisely,
to have it guided on their behalf) is retained by the shareholders be-
cause they are the group that values it most highly."
The implication is clear. Since shareholders value fiduciary du-
ties most highly, they will pay other corporate constituencies for the
right to have these duties inure to their benefit. If, for example, the
3. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment
of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175.
4.Id.
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shareholders place an aggregate value of $10 million on the legal pro-
tection provided by a corporate governance system that allocates fi-
duciary duties exclusively to shareholders, while other constituents
value it at $2 million, then both parties will be better off if the share-
holders are permitted to compensate these other constituencies - in
the form of higher interest on bonds, higher wages to workers and
managers, and better prices for suppliers and customers - for the
right to have fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them.
Thus, all constituencies will be better off by allocating fiduciary
duties within the firm exclusively to shareholders if the latter place
the highest value on such duties. But why would shareholders, as
residual claimants, place the highest value on fiduciary duties? After
all, once we accept the view that the firm is not an entity at all, but a
set of contracts or series of bargains, the organization decomposes
into a group of identifiable participants - e.g., investors, managers,
creditors, employees, and suppliers - who negotiate an equilibrium
position among themselves. An implication of this perspective is to
deny that anyone class of participants (i.e., the shareholders) have a
natural right to view themselves as the owners of the firm. Rather,
shareholders are seen not as the firm's owners, but as suppliers of
equity capital; they are the "residual claimants," who bring to the
firm their special ability at risk-bearing, which creditors, managers,
and employees tend to lack.5
Of course, "[o]nce we view the shareholders as simply the residual
claimants who have agreed to accept a more uncertain future return
because of their superior risk-bearing capacity, it is far from self-evi-
dent that shareholders are necessarily entitled to control the firm,"6
Le., to have managers' and directors' fiduciary duties flow exclusively
to them.
The rationale for why shareholders place the highest value on
such rights is said to be that:
Uniquely, the residual claimants ... are interested in the firm's
overall profitability, whereas creditors and managers [and presuma-
bly other constituents as well] are essentially fixed claimants who
wish only to see their claims repaid and who will logically tend to
resist risky activities. Having less interest in the overall [economic]
performance of the firm, creditors can bargain through contract and
5. J. CHOPER, J. COFFEE & R. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 28-29 (3d
ed. 1989) (footnote omitted).
6. Id. at 29.
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do not need representation on the board to monitor all aspects of
the firm's performance.'
Thus, fiduciary duties exist because the decisions that face of-
ficers and directors of corporations are sufficiently complex and diffi-
cult to predict that it would not be feasible to specify in advance how
to respond to a wide range of future contingencies. Fiduciary duties
are the mechanism invented by the legal system for filling in the un-
specified terms of shareholders' contingent contracts. These duties
run solely to shareholders because, as residual claimants, "[t]he gains
and losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of
the shareholders, whose claims stand last in line."8 As Easterbrook
and Fischel have observed:
As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the
appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions. The
firm should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and
costs are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the
shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those 'with fixed
claims on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in in-
creased security) from the undertaking of a new project. The share-
holders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the
marginal costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise
discretion [or to have it exercised on their behalf].9
A simple example can be used to illustrate this point. Suppose
that a firm has two classes of claimants, fixed and residual. The firm
will owe $1 million to the fixed claimants at the end of period one.
Suppose further that the firm has to choose between two projects,
"A" and "B." Both of these projects will require the firm to allocate
100% of its resources to that project for the relevant period. Project
A has a 50% chance of producing a payoff with a present value of $1
million and a 50% chance of producing a payoff with a present value
of $5 million at the end of period one. Thus, the expected present
value of project A is $3 million. lo Project B, on the other hand, has a
payoff matrix in which there is a 50% chance of a payoff with a pre-
sent value of $1 million, and a 50% chance of a payoff with a present
value of $6 million. Thus, while project A has an expected value of $3
million, project B has an expected value of $3.5 million.
7. Id.
8. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983).
9. Id.
10. (.5 x $1,000,000) + (.5 x $5,000,000) = $3,000,000.
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The shareholders will prefer project B, since they are better off
by $500,000 if they select that project.ll The fixed claimants, by con-
trast, are indifferent as to whether the firm selects project A or pro-
ject B, because under either outcome, the fixed claimants are abso-
lutely certain to obtain the $1 million that is owed to them by the
firm. Where a firm is making a decision like this, the fixed claimants
clearly do not deserve a role in the decisionmaking process. The firm
and society are better off if the firm selects project B, because that is
the project that maximizes the firm's and society's stock of wealth.
No purpose is served by giving the firm's :fixed claimants any stake in
the decisionmaking process. The only possible result of their involve-
ment would be to permit them to threaten obstruction of the firm's
efforts to undertake project B in order to extract a side payment of
some kind.
This example intuitively suggests that undivided fiduciary duties
should flow to a firm's shareholders. Because this decision, like so
many decisions made by corporations, is infra-marginal with respect
to all constituencies other than shareholders, the shareholders should
be the only parties with legal rights in the decisionmaking process.
Further, as Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, the shareholders' posi-
tion within the firm is unique because shareholders are the only
group with a meaningful stake in every decision made by a solvent
firm.12
But suppose that the decision was between project A as de-
scribed above and a third project, "C." Project C has a 50% chance
of producing a payoff at the end of period one with a present value of
$500,000 and a 50% chance of producing a payoff at the end of per-
iod one with a present value of $10 million.
The shareholders would prefer project C to project A (or project
B for that matter). Project C has an expected value of $5.25 million,
11. Project A has an expected value to the shareholders of $2 million. If the project only
makes $1 million, the fixed claimants will get all of the gains from the project, and there will be
nothing left over for the shareholders. If the project makes $5 million, the shareholders will get
$4 million because the first million goes to satisfy the firm's obligations to the fixed claimants.
Thus, project A has an expected value to the shareholders of $2 million (.5 x $4,000,000 =
$2,000,000).
Project B has an expected value to the shareholders of $2.5 million. As before, if the pro-
ject only makes $1 million, the shareholders get nothing. If the project makes $6 million, the
shareholders will get $5 million because the first million will go to the fixed claimants of the
firm. Thus, project B has an expected value to the shareholders of $2.5 million (.5 x $5,000,000
= $2,500,000).
12. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 404.
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yielding an expected return to shareholders of $4.25 million. This
compares favorably with project A's expected return to shareholders
of $2 million (after subtracting fixed claims), and project B's ex-
pected return to shareholders of $2.5 million (after fixed claims).
However, unlike the choice between projects A and B, the firm's fixed
claimants are not indifferent with respect to the decision to select
project C. Under project C, there is a 50% chance that the fixed
claimants will be paid only half of the full $1 million that is owed to
them.
As such, fixed claimants would be willing to pay for the right to
block project C; thus, it is simply incorrect to say that the sharehold-
ers are the only group with the correct incentives to decide whether
to adopt project C or project A or B. Nor does society benefit by
exclusively allocating fiduciary duties to the shareholders. It is possi-
ble to manipulate the numbers in the above examples - and the ac-
tual projects selected in the real world - to transfer wealth from the
fixed claimants to the residual claimants while reducing rather than
increasing the overall value of the firm. Imagine, for example, that
the firm is selecting between two projects, "D" and "E." Project D
presents a 50% chance of producing absolutely nothing and a 50%
chance of producing a present value payoff of $1.5 million at the end
of period one. Project E presents a 100% chance of producing a pre-
sent value payoff at the end of period one of $1 million. Ex ante, the
overall value of the firm is maximized by selecting project E, since
that produces a present expected value of $1 million, while project D
produces a present expected value of only $750,000. The sharehold-
ers, however, would prefer project D to project E, since under project
E there is no chance that the shareholders will realize any payoff at
all, while under project D there is a 50% chance that the sharehold-
ers will realize something, (i.e. $500,000). Thus, if the shareholders
are left in complete control, they will have incentives "to adopt vari-
ous strategies with the effect of transferring wealth from bondholders
to shareholders, such as· choosing risky investment projects and with-
drawing assets from the firm. "l3 As the above example suggests, some
of the strategies that shareholders can adopt to transfer wealth from
the fixed claimants and other constituencies to themselves reduce the
value of the firm and reduce overall societal wealth as well.
Describing shareholders as residual claimants to the cash flow of
13.Id.
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the modern corporation therefore does not completely explain why
fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them. While the shareholders' sta-
tus as residual claimants provides a persuasive rationale for why their
interests should trump with respect to a wide range of transactions, it
is also clearly the case that other claimants have a strong interest in
participating, at least to some extent, in some of the decisions of the
firm. Other claimants face the realistic prospect of tangible loss if
decisions about how the firm's resources should be allocated are not
made with their interests in mind.
Thus, the argument that shareholders, because they have the
greatest incentive to maximize the value of the firm, should be the
sole beneficiaries of the legal protection afforded by fiduciary duties
is incomplete. It does not explain why the interests of other claim-
ants should not be respected, at least as to those decisions that have
the potential to affect their interests directly.
B. The "Too Many Masters" Argument
The second and perhaps the most common argument made
against nonshareholder constituency statutes is that such statutes, to
the extent they effect any change whatsoever in existing law, simply
confuse the legal landscape by forcing directors to attempt an impos-
sible task - pleasing a multitude of masters with competing and
conflicting interests. As the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
American Bar Association's Section on Business Law has argued in
its position paper on nonshareholder constituency statutes:
The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such stat-
utes, if interpreted to require directors to balance the interests of
various constituencies without according primacy to shareholder in-
terests, would be profoundly troubling. Even under existing law,
particularly where directors must act quickly, it is often difficult for
directors acting in good faith to divine what is in the best interests
of shareholders and the corporation. If directors are required to con-
sider other interests as well, the decision-making process will be-
come a balancing act or search for compromise. When directors
must not only decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also
to whom their duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer
decisions can be expected. l '
In one view, the "too many masters argument" implies that non-
14. ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2269.
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shareholder constituency statutes make life more difficult for corpo-
rate managers and boards of directors. The better view is that such
statutes simplify life for incumbent managers of the large, public cor-
poration. Mter all, virtually any management decision, no matter
how arbitrary, can be rationalized on the grounds that it benefits
some constituency of the corporation.
Take, for example, the issue of whether a firm should relocate its
headquarters from the large metropolis that has served as its base for
many years to a small town with better schools, lower labor costs, and
lower taxes. While shareholders might profit from this move, the
community in which the firm is presently located would clearly suf-
fer. Some employees might benefit, others might suffer. The firm
could justify virtually any decision as serving the interests of some
constituency. Imagine now that the proposal to relocate the company
comes not from incumbent management, but from an outside bidder
who is launching a hostile tender offer for the company at a substan-
tial premium over the current market price of the firm's shares. Here
the nonshareholder constituency statute can be used to justify re-
sisting a lucrative offer that may be in the best interests of the
shareholders.
Thus, the primary beneficiaries of nonshareholder constituency
statutes are incumbent managers, who can justify virtually any deci-
sion they make on the grounds that it benefits some constituency of
the firm. The benefits to the constituencies are, at best, weak. Strong
support for this assertion lies in the fact that not only are these stat-
utes (with a single exception)1li permissive, but they also do not af-
ford standing to sue to any of the nonshareholder constituencies that
they purportedly are designed to benefit.I6 At the same time, they
effect alarming changes in officer and director accountability to
shareholders.
Dean Robert Clark expressed a similar sentiment, and observed
that it is socially optimal for corporate law to single-mindedly pro-
mote the profit-maximizing interests of shareholders:
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily moni-
tored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasona-
ble accommodation of all affected interests. . . . Assuming share-
holders have some control mechanisms, better monitoring means
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
16. Wallman, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Placing the Corporation's Interests
First, Bus. LAW. UPDATE, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 1,2.
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that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They are
more likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it
efficiently.17
The "too many masters" argument does answer the question of
why state legislatures have been so eager to enact these statutes. As
one of their staunchest defenders has noted, nonshareholder constit-
uency statutes were "[b]orn principally of last decade's takeover bat-
tles."18 Of course, the winners of the takeover battles of the 1980s
were corporate shareholders, while the losers were incumbent manag-
ers. Nonshareholder constituency statutes give such managers the
ability to obtain politically what they were unable to obtain in the
marketplace - meaningful job security regardless of the quality of
their performance.
But the "too many masters argument" is overstated. Corpora-
tions traditionally have been able to issue multiple classes of common
and preferred stock. And corporate managers and directors have dis-
charged fiduciary duties to all of these claimants simultaneously. Just
as the interests of common shareholders can conflict with the inter-
ests of nonshareholder constituencies, so too can the interests of one
class of equity claimants conflict with the interests of other classes.
In particular, certain preferred shareholders may have interests that
more closely resemble those of fixed claimants than those of common
shareholders. Such preferred shareholders may prefer that a firm re-
frain from engaging in certain risky projects, while the common
shareholders would prefer that the firm undertake such projects. Cor-
porate boards have traditionally balanced the conflicting interests of
such groups in a beneficial manner.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,19 the
Delaware Supreme Court opined that it is permissible for a corpora-
tion to take the interests of nonshareholder constituencies into ac-
count, at least when there is no ongoing auction for the firm in pro-
gress.20 In particular, a corporate board may take account of various
corporate constituencies such as creditors, customers, employees, and
the community generally when deciding how to proceed, so long as
the action ultimately taken in the interests of these corporate groups
meets the basic requirement that "there be some rationally related
17. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986).
18. Wallman, supra note 16, at 1.
19. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
20. Id. at 176-82.
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benefit accruing to the stockholders."21
In Revlon, the company was faced with a hostile takeover bid,
and the firm's board of directors attempted to defeat the outside bid
by entering into a lock-up agreement with a friendly suitor, ostensi-
bly for the purpose of benefitting certain of the firm's fixed claim-
ants. The Delaware Supreme Court found that, by the time Revlon
entered into the lock-up, "a break-up of the company was inevita-
ble."22 Once this was true, the directors' sole concern changed from
being "defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for shareholders ...."23 Management was no
longer permitted to take the interests of nonshareholder constituen-
cies into account in deciding how to proceed. Other cases have reiter-
ated that corporate managers may take the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies into account, not only in their daily
management of the firm, but also when deciding whether to accept or
oppose an outside offer.24
Two aspects of the Delaware Court's embrace of the non-
shareholder constituency ideal deserve special attention. First, as the
Committee on Corporate Laws has observed, in no case has the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that directors will be permitted to prefer
the interests of other constituencies over shareholders. Nor has the
court decreed that they ought, as a normative matter, to take such
interests into account.25 The Committee has reformulated the posi-
tion of the Delaware Supreme Court to be that:
[D]irectors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders which,
while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of
others, compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the
long-term interests of shareholders when so doing. In Delaware, this
principle is modified when the decision is made to sell the company,
at which time the directors may consider only the interests of
shareholders.26
Second, it is noteworthy that the Delaware approach to the non-
shareholder constituency issue (like the argument made above con-
cerning residual claimants) recognizes that, over a wide range of is-
21. [d. at 176.
22. [d. at 182.
23. [d.
24. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987).
25. ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2260.
26. [d. at 2261.
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sues, there really is no conflict between the interests of other
constituencies and the interests of shareholders. Taking steps to im-
prove worker morale is good for workers and good for shareholders.
Taking steps to improve relations with the local community also has
beneficial effect. Similarly, drafting strong bond covenants or culti-
vating a reputation for fair dealing with bondholders or other constit-
uencies benefits the shareholders in the form of lower interest costs
for debt and a lower cost of doing business generally.
Moreover, the Delaware approach recognizes the Hayekian argu-
ment that it generally is not possible to know with certainty which
actions are in shareholders' interests and which are not.27 Managers
must be given plenty of latitude for experimentation. In addition,
many technological or operational improvements that managers may
make are at least as likely to come about as a result of pure happen-
stance and fortuity as they are of careful strategic planning. Conse-
quently, judicial efforts to hold managers to a strict profit-maximiza-
tion standard through the palliative of ex post review of corporate
decisions is not likely to benefit anyone other than the legal commu-
nity. The obvious exception to this general rule occurs where there is
a palpable conflict of interest between the actions of managers and
the interests of shareholders. Where this is the case, there is, of
course, an important role to be played by judicial enforcement of cor-
porate law norms.
To the extent that managers act in ways that are suboptimal
from the shareholders' perspective, they will be disciplined, if at all,
by the various markets in which such managers must operate.28 Be-
cause of the problems of knowledge and uncertainty in the world of
business, managers often act on the basis of custom, tradition, force
of habit, by imitating the actions of more successful competitors, or
as a consequence of a complex set of conflicting motivations. Courts
are likely to be even worse than managers and directors at determin-
ing with absolute certainty which actions are in the best interests of
27. A basic tenet of Austrian economic thought, as exemplified by the work of Friedric A.
Hayek, is that "there is an inherent unpredictability and indeterminacy with regard to human
preferences, expectations and knowledge." Kirzner, On the Method of Austrian Economics, in
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 40, 48 (E. Dolan, ed. 1976); see also FA
HAYEK, Economics and Knowledge, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 33 (1948).
28. These markets include the market for corporate control, the internal and external
managerial labor markets, and the markets for the products offered by the firm. See Easter-
brook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L.
540, 543 (1984).
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shareholders and which are not. Allowing managers to take the inter-
ests of a variety of constituencies into account simply acknowledges
that ex post second-guessing of managerial decisions probably does
more harm than good. It is best for all parties concerned if courts
decline to intrude on the internal process of corporate governance,
except where such decisions are clearly motivated by self-interest.
To the extent that nonshareholder constituency statutes are in-
terpreted in ways that are consistent with this general form of corpo-
rate law, they will be beneficial, not harmful. Consistent with the ap-
proach taken by the Delaware Supreme Court, the fact that such
statutes give incumbent managers more freedom is only worrisome if
managers can use that freedom in ways that are inconsistent with
shareholder welfare.
The problem with nonshareholder constituency statutes is not
that they require managers and directors to serve too many masters.
The problem is that they have the potential to permit managers and
directors to serve no one but themselves.
C. The Real Concern: Shareholders as the Group with the Most
Acute Need for Fiduciary Duties
The real drawback of nonshareholder constituency statutes is
that they fail to recognize that shareholders face more daunting con-
tracting problems than other constituencies. These acute contracting
problems vindicate the traditional common law rule that managers
and directors owe their primary fiduciary responsibilities to share-
holders. Nonshareholder constituencies can protect themselves
against virtually any kind of managerial opportunism by retaining
negative control over the firm's operations. Workers, bondholders,
and even local communities can protect their interests by contracting
for the right to veto future proposed actions by management. By con-
trast, the shareholders must retain positive control over the actions
of the firm in order to realize the full potential value of their shares.
Merely because nonshareholder constituencies decline to con-
tract for the right to veto certain transactions does not mean that
they are unable to do so. Rather, the absence of contractual protec-
tion for nonshareholder constituencies may simply reflect the fact
that such constituencies are unwilling to pay for such protection in
the form of lower wages or lower interest rates on debt.
Workers are perhaps the group with whom one sympathizes the
most when thinking about the possible benefits associated with non-
shareholder constituency statutes. Unlike shareholders, who are con-
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cerned with the overall profitability of the firm in which they have
invested, workers are concerned with wages, pensions, hours, and
working conditions. From a contracting perspective, wages and hours
pose few, if any, contracting problems. Workers could potentially
protect their wage expectations with pension guarantees, golden
parachutes,29 successor clauses, stipulated cost of living adjustments,
and other straightforward provisions. Similarly, workers can obtain
credible assurances against being forced to work undesirable hours
simply by precisely stipulating the length of the work day. Working
conditions can be guaranteed by making reference to a well-known
status quo and requiring the employer to maintain working condi-
tions at that level or above.
The point here is not to suggest that workers actually have the
contracting power to protect their wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. Rather, the point is simply that, unlike shareholders, it is at
least technologically possible for workers to protect themselves by
drafting strong contractual provisions in their favor. Moreover,
should unforeseen contingencies arise that cast doubt on the efficacy
of contractual protection, courts can protect workers by construing
their employment contracts in light of the original purposes behind
the agreements. Gap-filling by modern judges in interpreting con-
tracts provides workers with the same sorts of protection that fiduci-
ary duties provide for shareholders.
It might be argued that rank-and-file employees lack bargaining
power, and that at-will employment contracts are likely to reflect this
lack of bargaining power. Consequently, it has been argued that the
gap-filling that is done in the context of at-will employment contracts
is likely to be unhelpful to employees.
This argument is flawed and without merit. If workers lack bar-
gaining power in their employment relationship, changing the law to
add a fiduciary duty to this relationship will harm workers, not help
them. This is because extending the reach of fiduciary duties to rank-
and-file employees will not change any fundamental imbalance in the
allocation of bargaining power between workers and their employers
that already exists. Any legal regime that "protects" workers by mak-
ing them the "beneficiaries" of fiduciary duties will, by definition,
make those same workers less valuable (in monetary terms) to their
employers. The employers will, in turn, utilize any bargaining power
29. These contracts typically provide a generous severance package in the event of a ma-
jor corporate reorganization involving layoffs or shutdowns.
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they possess to make the employees pay the full costs of these new
legal obligations. Any employer unable to force her workers to pay
these costs would not have unequal bargaining power in the first
place.
Thus, if workers with little bargaining power being paid $8.00
per hour were made the beneficiaries of a new set of fiduciary duties,
their employers would simply respond to the additional costs of the
new legal responsibilities associated with these duties by reducing the
wages or benefits of those same workers by the amount of the addi-
tional costs. This is what it means to have unequal bargaining power.
Employers unable (due to minimum wage laws or other con-
straints) to reduce workers' wages or benefits simply will hire fewer
workers. Thus, it is not possible to sustain the argument that impos-
ing fiduciary duties will help workers who lack bargaining power; any
lack of bargaining power on the part of the workers simply will mani-
fest itself in some other way, such as in the form of a reduction in
wages.
Since workers generally prefer to receive compensation in the
form of cash wages rather than in other ways, even the workers them-
selves will prefer that fiduciary duties not be imposed on employers
since such duties will, at the margin, result in lower cash compensa-
tion to workers for the reasons just explained.
The above arguments apply with even more force to bondhold-
ers.30 First, bondholders can draft elaborately detailed contracts to
protect themselves from transactions that upset the original under-
standing between themselves and the firm. For example, bond inden-
tures often limit the ability of an issuer to borrow, merge, pay divi-
dends, repurchase stock, issue preferred stock, sell assets, or engage
in transactions with affiliate companies. While these provisions do lit-
tle to protect shareholders (and indeed might be deleterious to their
interests), they do much to protect bondholders and other fixed
claimants against wealth transfers by other corporate interests.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that, for the purposes of the argu-
ments presented in this paper, the issue is not whether bondholders
have the bargaining power to obtain every contractual protection
they desire when covenants and indentures are drafted. After all,
bondholders, like other nonshareholder constituencies, are free to de-
cline to invest in the firm if they are not satisfied with the risk/return
30. Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting, An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J.
FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
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trade-off being offered.
Instead, the relevant issue is whether it is technologically possi-
ble for the bondholders to protect themselves via contract. If it is,
their only obstacle is price. Unlike shareholders, who must rely on
the gap-filling protection afforded by fiduciary duties for assurance
that a firm will maximize profits, bondholders can protect the present
value of their fixed claims by drafting "put" provisions that give
them the legal right to force the firm to repurchase the bonds at a
predetermined price upon the occurrence of certain contingencies.
Put provisions also have been drafted to require the firm to adjust
the payments to fixed claimants so as to compensate them for such
increased risks as higher leverage or downgrades in the firm's credit
rating.
The put provisions accompanying bond sales generally are trig-
gered by a merger or major restructuring, a change in the firm's own-
ership, a significant share repurchase, or similar transaction.31 Of
course, it would be possible to draft even more complete protection
for nonshareholder constituencies such as bondholders. The right to
put the bonds back to the issuer might be triggered any time the
market price of the bonds fell to a predetermined level in the open
market. Such a provision would be easy to monitor and enforce and
would provide virtually complete protection for bondholders against
unforeseen contingencies. The issue, then, is not whether non-
shareholder constituencies can protect themselves via contract, but
whether they are willing to pay for such protection.
III. GAP-FILLING FOR NONSHAREHOLDER
CONSTITUENCIES
The familiar retort to the preceding argument is that sharehold-
ers and the corporate managers who serve them are endlessly crea-
tive. As such, no matter how elaborate the guarantees, without the
broad-based gap-filling provided by fiduciary duties, management's
newly devised strategies will undermine whatever contractual protec-
tion nonshareholder constituencies negotiate.
An interesting variant on this argument has been made in an im-
portant article by Columbia University's Professor John Coffee.32 He
31. Winkler, Harris, Williams Cos. Unit Are First to Offer Super 'Poison Puts', Wall St.
J., Nov. 16, 1988, at 8.3, p.1, c.3.
32. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1986).
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argues that the hostile takeover itself is best viewed as a shareholder
strategy for reneging on the original bargain between nonshareholder
constituencies (particularly managers) and the firm:
[T]he hostile takeover can be seen not simply as a mechanism that
compels a management to accept that level of business risk that
shareholders deem appropriate, but as a means by which sharehold-
ers outflank the safeguards managers obtained to protect the
promises of deferred compensation and job security [that sharehold-
ers have given to managers]. Thus, what appears from the bidder's
perspective to be a process of purging organizational slack looks
from the manager's viewpoint more like deceptive reneging on the
original understanding.33
The ex post reneging argument seems flawed for two reasons.
First, as noted above, nonshareholder constituencies can draft con-
tracts that protect them against the consequences of future, unfore-
seen contingencies. Foreseeable contingencies such as hostile take-
overs and corporate restructuring are even easier for nonshareholder
constituencies to deal with contractually. Poison puts for bondhold-
ers and golden parachutes for workers have the potential to almost
completely protect nonshareholder constituencies.
Second, it is inaccurate to suggest that absent nonshareholder
constituency statutes, only shareholders enjoy the protection afforded
by judicial gap-filling. An impressive body of literature indicates that
modern judges should and do go a long way toward filling in unstated
terms and conditions in long-term relational contracts34 such as those
forged between nonshareholder constituencies and public corpora-
tions. Modern courts examine the nature of the understanding be-
tween two contracting parties and interpret legal disputes between
them in light of this understanding. Thus, nonshareholder constitu-
encies (with the exception of local communities) already enjoy sub-
stantial gap-filling protection.
To be sure, there have been notable cases in which non-
shareholder constituencies have sued to vindicate implied contract
terms and have lost.311 But such cases only illustrate that, ex post, all
parties have an incentive to urge courts to interpret contracts in the
33. [d. at 24.
34. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
35. See, for example, the suit brought by bondholders of RJR Nabisco challenging the
$25 billion leveraged buyout of that firm. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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way that suits their interests. Courts must sift through competing ar-
guments to obtain the result most consistent with the parties' origi-
nal understanding.
For nonshareholder constituencies, the starting point for this ju-
dicial gap-filling process must be the contract itself. It may be an
employment agreement, a collective bargaining agreement, a bond in-
denture, or a standard form contract between a firm and its suppliers
or customers. For shareholders, it is widely recognized36 that the
"contract" they enter establishes that managers have a duty "to
make corporate decisions so as to maximize the value of [their]
shares ...."37 Fiduciary duties are a corporate governance device
uniquely crafted to fill in the massive gap in this open-ended bargain
between shareholders and corporate officers and directors.
Recent attempts to expand the scope of managements' fiduciary
duties to nonshareholder constituencies are therefore misguided for
two reasons that have previously gone unrecognized. First, to the ex-
tent that such duties are legally enforceable, they shift the focal
point of the analysis of the relationship away from the actual con-
tract between the relevant constituency and the firm. Allocating fidu-
ciary obligations to nonshareholder constituencies takes the judicial
gap-filling process out of its proper framework, depriving judges of
any coherent basis for allocating rights and responsibilities within' the
firm.
Inevitably, removing the gap-filling done by judges for non-
shareholder constituencies from a contractual framework and placing
it in a fiduciary duty framework creates potential conflicts between
the express and implied terms of the actual bargains that such non-
shareholder constituencies have struck with the firm and the new
"rights" being created by nonshareholder constituency statutes. To
the extent that these new rights are allowed to trump the terms con-
tained in a contract between a nonshareholder constituency and the
firm, such statutes simply transfer wealth from shareholders to these
other constituencies. The specter of such wealth transfers diminishes
incentives to invest in public corporations, impedes capital forma-
tion, and reduces societal wealth generally.
36. Macey, supra note 3, at 186.
37. R. CLARK, supra note 17, at 17-18.
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IV. THE LOCAL COMMUNITY
[Vol. XXI
Local communities constitute a possible exception to the above
analysis because, unlike nonshareholder constituencies, they may
have no preexisting contractual relationship with the firm that can
provide the basis for reconstructing the original understanding be-
tween the parties in the event of future conflict. Of course, a local
community will often negotiate to provide certain services and infra-
structure support in exchange for a decision by the firm to locate in
that community. In such cases, adding fiduciary duties to the local
community on top of the express contracts between the firm and the
community will only hinder the ultimate resolution of future
disputes.
But often there will be no express or implied understanding be-
tween a firm and its community.38 Where there is no agreement, cre-
ating an amorphous, open-ended fiduciary duty to the local commu-
nity in which the firm operates is impractical.
Creating such a duty transforms the top managers of public com-
panies from private businessmen into unelected and unaccountable
public servants. A decision to elevate the interests of a local commu-
nity above the interests of a firm's shareholders is nothing less than a
decision about how to allocate wealth within society. Further, there
seems to be a broad consensus that "the reallocation of wealth is a
function for which directors are not especially suited and one beyond
the general pale of their perceived mandate from society."39
Expanding the scope of a firm's fiduciary duties to include local
communities, as with other nonshareholder constituencies, is unnec-
essary. Local communities have unique access to the political process.
If actions of a firm are genuinely detrimental to a local community,
the members of that community can appeal to their elected repre-
sentatives in state and local government for redress. Under either a
pluralist or a republican understanding of governmental process,"o lo-
cal communities should be able to mobilize into an effective political
38. See Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 618 (1988)
(describing the disruptions caused to the community of Youngstown, Ohio when the United
States Steel Company closed two plants there).
39. ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2270; see also Note, Takeover
Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Brothers' Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. BUB. L.
REV. 301.
40. For a republican perspective on government, see Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). For a pluralist critique, see Macey, The Missing Element in
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673 (1988).
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coalition to press for protection from harmful actions by corpora-
tions. The better argument seems to be that corporations need pro-
tection from local communities' abuse of the political process at least
as much as local communities need protection from opportunistic
corporate behavior. The political capital generated by local politi-
cians over the strike at the New York Daily News illustrates this
point nicely.4l Politicians have been falling all over themselves to
demonstrate solidarity with the striking Daily News employees, with
little or no regard for the substantive merits of the dispute.
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act42 shows
that local communities can protect themselves in the political process
and hardly need any additional protection that might be afforded by
a plant closing law. The Act requires that, under virtually all condi-
tions, firms with one hundred or more employees give workers and
communities sixty days notice prior to closing a plant. The Act re-
quires that workers be paid for every day that they are deprived of
notice.43
CONCLUSION
The argument that the fiduciary duties of officers and directors
in public corporations should run exclusively to shareholders and not
to other constituencies is an uneasy one. As shown above, the share-
holders' unique status as residual claimants provides a persuasive ra-
tionale for allocating fiduciary duties to shareholders in some, but by
no means all, situations. In simple terms, where nonshareholder con-
stituencies have no meaningful stake in a particular decision, they
have no constructive role to play in the decisionmaking process. In-
cluding them in such decisions would lead to opportunism and a dim-
inution in societal wealth. On the other hand, nonshareholder con-
stituencies plainly have a meaningful stake in a wide range of
decisions. Thus, the special role of shareholders as residual claimants
does not completely explain why shareholders should be the sole ben-
eficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties.
I have stressed that the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders is a
41. See, e.g., Stars Meet Press at News-Aid, Newsday, Dec. 15, 1990, at 6 (city ed.).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
43. Id. § 2104(a). The statute provides exceptions for businesses struck by unforeseen
circumstances and businesses in dire financial straits. Id. § 2102(b)(2). For further background
on this provision, see Wehr, Reagan Bows to Politics on Plant Closing Bill, 46 CONGo Q. WKLY.
REP. 2216, 2216 (1988).
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device that fills in the implied terms of the contract existing between
shareholders and the firm. This contract requires officers and direc-
tors of corporations to maximize overall firm value for shareholders.
The fiduciary duty owed to shareholders is the only gap-filling device
available to protect shareholders' investments. By contrast, other
claimants enjoy the gap-filling that courts routinely supply when in-
terpreting the terms of their contracts with the firm. Thus, allocating
a fiduciary duty to shareholders does not really give shareholders a
level of protection not enjoyed by nonshareholder constituencies. In-
stead, the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders simply provides the
residual claimants with a level of judicial protection commensurate
with the nature of the firm's contractual obligations to them.
Ironically, the ostensible reason for enactment of nonshareholder
constituency statutes is to provide such nonshareholder constituents
with the enhanced legal protections that shareholders enjoy. In fact,
in light of the pervasive conflicts of interest that exist between share-
holders and managers, it seems clear that if any group within the
firm is in need of additional legal protection it is the shareholders.
Instead, the recent wave of nonshareholder constituency statutes
gives undesirable leeway to incumbent management to rationalize du-
bious or arbitrary corporate strategies that reduce the overall value of
the firm on the suspect grounds that some nonshareholder constitu-
ency will benefit.
